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Basel Norms and Analysis of Banking Risks; Performance and Future Prospects. 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analysis in detailed the major financial risks which are faced by the 
banking sector in general and Indian banks in particular. For the purpose a loss function is devised 
to estimate the various components of the credit risk which result in the net losses for the banks. 
The study is supported by empirical analysis conducted on financial data of a cross section of 
banks in Public Sector, Private Sector and Foreign Banks operating in India. Suggestions are also 
put forward mainly to minimize the credit risk. 
 
The Indian Banking Sector has come a long way since 1960s, the end of which decade marked the 
first major paradigm shift in the banking scenario. During 1969, there was nationalization of 14 
major commercial banks in keeping with socialistic policies then pursed by the government. 
Another major paradigm shift was witnessed by the Indian financial system in the year 1991. The 
Phase of the liberalization of the Indian economy was started by Dr. Manmohan Singh, then 
Finance Minister under Prime Minister Narasimhan Rao government. A strong need was felt to 
liberate the Indian financial system from the state control and allow the economic forces to 
operate freely so as to ensure the efficiency of the financial operations as well as bring about an 
appropriate allocation of the available financial resources. This period was marked by majors 
reforms in the banking and the financial sectors. The main objectives underlying the banking 
sector reforms in India were to enhance the stability, efficiency and complete transparency in the 
functioning of the Indian banking system.  
It was imperative in order to integrate the Indian financial system with its global counterparts. 
Consequently, Basel Prudential Norms had to implement in Indian Banking Sector. The 
Prudential Norms applicable to the banks in general, can be traced to “The Basel Committee on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices”, which in 1987 submitted its report and arrived 
at consensus of 8% as the minimum capital-adequacy ratio. Thus, this framework referred to as 
Basel-I Framework. It represented a pioneering attempt at integrating and harmonizing the capital 
standard of the banks across the countries.  The above Basel-I Accord in its original version 
included mainly the credit-risks in the banks’ operations. 
In 1996, an amendment was sought to also include the market-risks in this framework. This 
approach was aimed at risk-sensitive nature of the banks’ investments and able to capture their 
risk-exposure more comprehensively. However in India, Basel-I framework required 9% of 
minimum capital adequacy ratio, which slightly higher than the BIS norms. 
In order to address the inadequacy of Basel-I framework, a revised framework was introduced in 
June 2004. To support the main objective of Basel-I that is, to broadly maintain aggregate level of 
capital adequacy ratio to 9%, a need to adopt more advanced risk-sensitive approach for 
calculating capital adequacy ratio under the revised Basel-II framework. Basel II framework 
consider a three-pillar approach to regulatory capital measurement and capital standards – (a) 
Pillar 1 (minimum capital requirements); (b) Pillar 2 (supervisory oversight); and (c) Pillar 3 
(market discipline and disclosures). 
Pillar 1 represents the capital requirement of a bank in relation to the credit risk in its portfolio, 
which is a significant change from the “one size fits all” approach of Basel I. Pillar 1 allows 
flexibility to banks and supervisors to choose from among the Standardised Approach and 
Internal Ratings Based Approach to calculate the capital requirement for credit risk exposures. 
The main impact of Pillar 1 of Basel II framework is geared towards maintaining a continued 
state of liquidity and financial stability in all the banks. The minimum capital adequacy ratio 
recommended under the Basel II norms continues to be at nine percent, at alone as well as 
consolidated level. The new standards for minimum capital requirement will be achieved by 
employing the methodology for assigning risk-weighted approach on the basis of credit risk, 
market risk and also specifies capital requirement for operational risk. However, the banks are 
expected to operate at the level well above the minimum capital requirement. The banks are also 
required to achieve the tier I capital ratio of six per cent not later than March 31, 2010.  
Pillar 2 deals with the ‘Supervisory Review Process (SRP),  which requires the banks to 
established an Internal Capital adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) to cover the entire 
spectrum of risks which are either not fully included or which are completely ignored under the 
other two pillars. The ICAAP represents an important component of the Supervisory Review 
Process. This pillar would obviously receive the high priority which it deserves in implementation 
strategy of the banks. It is essential to note that the ICAAP as the name suggests is essentially a 
bank-driven process. Pillar 2 provides a tool to ICAAP to keep checks on the adequacy of 
capitalisation levels of banks and also distinguish among banks on the basis of their risk 
management systems and profile of capital. ICAAP takes into account the credit-concentration 
risk, interest rate risk in the banking books, business and strategic risk, liquidity risk and other 
residual risks such as reputation risk and business cycle risk. Thus enabling Pillar 2 to allow 
discretion to supervisors to (a) link capital to the risk profile of a bank; (b) take appropriate 
remedial measures if required; and (c) the banks to maintain capital at a level higher than the 
regulatory minimum. 
Pillar 3 provides a framework for the improvement of banks’ disclosure standards for financial 
reporting, risk management, asset quality and regulatory sanctions. This pillar also indicates the 
remedial measures that regulators can take to keep a check on erring banks and maintain the 
integrity of the banking system. Further, Pillar 3 allows banks to maintain confidentiality over 
certain information, disclosure of which could impact competitiveness or breach legal contracts. 
The basic premise underlying this pillar is that the market would be quite responsive to the 
disclosures made and the banks would be accordingly rewarded or penalized keeping with nature 
of their disclosures. This will ensure great transparency in banking operations. This pillar enables 
the banks to project their image of being responsible and accountable to their depositories in 
particulars and to the member of public in general. 
To meet the needs of changing business dynamics in banking sector has led to introduction of 
Basel-III norms. It is observed in the light of the recently advocated new Basel-III Norms, 
wherein a stricter approach increases the capital adequacy requirements by further including a 
mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and a discretionary counter-cyclical buffer of 2.5% 
of the capital to be maintained during the periods of high credit growth to be utilized during the 
periods of economic downswings.  
Based on Basel III frameworks, even RBI has released guidelines for Indian Banks on 2 May, 
2012 Implementation of these guidelines will begin from January 1, 2013 and the process will be 
completed by March 31, 2018. 
Highlights 
 Banks required to maintain a minimum 5.5% in common equity (as against the current 
3.6%) by March 31, 2015  
 Banks to create a capital conservation buffer (consisting of common equity) of 2.5% by 
March 31, 2018  
 Banks to maintain a minimum overall capital adequacy of 11.5% (against the current 9%) 
by March 31, 2018  
 Conditions stipulated to increase the loss absorption capacity of banks’ Additional Tier I; 
Banks not to issue additional Tier I capital to retail investors  
 Risk-based capital ratios to be supplemented with a leverage ratio of 4.5% during parallel 
run  
 Banks allowed to add interim profits (subject to conditions) for computation of core 
capital adequacy  
 Banks to deduct the entire amount of unamortised pension and gratuity liability from 
common equity Tier I capital for the purpose of capital adequacy ratios from January 1, 
2013. 
 
The main concern which led to the evolvement of the Prudential Norms initiated by the Basel 
Committee was the variety of risks which are inherent in the very nature of financial operations of 
the banks universally. Broadly speaking, these risks are classified into three major categories, 
namely: the credit risks, the market risks and the operational risks. 
Credit Risks 
Credit risks emerge from default due to non-payment of loans by individuals, companies and 
other borrowers. Banks can choose any of three methods to calculate credit risk 1) the 
standardized model 2) the internal ratings-based (IRB) model a) the foundation approach and b) 
the advance approach. As per the latest RBI guidelines vide Master Circular No. 
DBOD.BP.BC.23/21.06.001/2009-2010 dated July 7, 2009 
 
1)  The Standardized Model for Credit Risks 
The Standardized model under Basel I follow a portfolio approach, whereby assets are classified 
into different categories of risk baskets: - Claims on Organization for Economic Coordination and 
Development (OECD) has a 0% risk weight, Claims on banks incorporated in OECD has a 20% 
risk weight, Claims on residential mortgage has a 50% risk weight and Claims on consumers and 
corporates has a 100% risk weight. These risk weights are multiplied with their respective 
exposures to get Risk-Weighted Assets (RWAs). The Bank allocates weight risk to each of its 
assets and off-balance sheet positions (after conversion by using CCF). Capital charged for credit 
risk is summation of each RWAs multiplied by the Total capital requirement of 8%.  
This model follows the same methodology as Basel I, but it is more risk sensitive under Basel II 
by dividing commercial obligator into finer gradation of risk classifications, with risk weights that 
are a function of external independent credit rating agencies such  as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch. The table 1 mentioned below shows how credit ratings provided by three rating 
agencies are mapped on comparable basis. Similar credit ratings are also available for sovereigns 
and banks. 
 
 
Table 1: Total Capital Requirements on Corporate obligations under the Standardized 
Model of BIS II 
External Credit Rating 
AAA- to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ to 
BB- 
Below 
BB- Unrated 
Risk weight under BIS II 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Capital requirement under BIS 
II 1.6% 4% 8% 12% 8% 
Risk weight under BIS I 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Capital requirement under BIS 
I 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
 
To calculate the minimum capital requirement for credit risk purpose, all credit exposure- each 
known as the exposure at default (EAD) - in each risk weigh bucket are summed up, weighted by 
the appropriate risk from table 2.1 and then multiplied by the overall total capital requirement of 8 
percent. This approach takes credit risk mitigation into account by adjusting the transaction’s 
EAD to reflect collateral, credit derivatives, guarantee and offsetting on balance sheet netting. 
 
2)  Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) Models for Credit Risk 
Under the Foundation Internal Rating Based (FIRB), banks are generally expected to provide 
their own estimates of PD and rely on the supervisory estimates for other risk components, 
namely LGD, EAD and M while under the Advance Internal Rating Based (AIRB), banks provide 
their own estimates of PD, LGD and EAD and their own calculation of M. The definition 
mentioned below for core components of FIRB and AIRB are for corporate, sovereign and bank 
exposures. Based on the above variable the expected losses due to default can be computed as 
follows:  
 Expected Losses = PD x LGD x EAD 
There are certain minimum requirements of eligibility in order to apply the IRB approach (i.e., 
demonstration that the bank maintains the necessary information systems to accurately implement 
the IRB approach) and there is supervisory review of compliance with these minimum 
requirements.  
 
Probability of Default (PD) 
All banks whether using Foundation and Advance IRB approach, have to provide an internal 
estimate of the PD associate with the borrowers of each grade. To calculate PDs the historical 
data, risk profile, nature of investment and financing of counterparty are necessary for period that 
must cover entire economic cycle or minimum of five year (Youbaraj Paudel, 2007). Banks must 
use information and techniques that take appropriate account of the long-run experience when 
estimating the average PD (i.e. long term average PD) for each rating grade. For example, banks 
may use one or more of the three specific techniques: internal default experience, mapping to 
external data, and statistical default models. Banks may use data on internal default experience for 
the estimation of PD. A bank must demonstrate in its analysis that the estimates are reflective of 
underwriting standards and of any differences in the rating system that generated the data and the 
current rating system. In case where only limited data are available, underwriting standards or 
rating systems have changed, the bank must add a greater margin of conservatism in its estimate 
of PD. Mappings must be based on a comparison of internal rating criteria to the criteria used by 
the external rating agency and a comparison of the internal and external ratings of any common 
borrowers. The external agency’s criteria underlying the data used for quantification must be 
oriented to the risk of the borrower and not reflect transaction characteristics. A bank is allowed 
to use a simple average of PD estimates for individual borrowers in a given grade, where such 
estimates are drawn from statistical default prediction models. 
Loss Given Default (LGD) 
LGD is defined as the percentage of EAD the bank might lose in case the borrower defaults. It is 
facility- specific due to losses generally understood to be influenced by key transaction 
characteristics such as presence of collateral, guarantee and the degree of subordination.  
There are two approaches by which the banks can calculate LGD of an exposure under the IRB 
Approach: 
a. A foundation approach 
b. An advanced approach 
Estimation of LGD must cover a period of at least one complete cycle or minimum a period of 
seven years from at least one source for both the approaches. 
LGD under the Foundation IRB Approach 
The Table 2, the estimates of LGDs for both unsecured and secured exposures under F-IRB 
framework has been provided:- 
 
 LGD for unsecured and non-recognised collaterised exposures 
Type of exposure Minimum LGD %     
Senior Unsecured claim 45     
Subordinated Claim 75     
LGD for collaterised exposures-Under eligible collaterals 
Type of Collateral Minimum LGD % Threshold level of 
collateralisation required 
for partial recognition of 
collateral for the 
exposure (C*) 
Required level of 
(over) collaterisation 
for full recognition 
of collateral for the 
exposure (C**) 
Eligible financial 
collateral ®                         -                               -                        -    
Eligible financial 
receivables                        35                             -                     125  
Eligible Commerical 
Real Estate (CRE)/ 
Residential Real Estate 
(RRE)                        35                            30                   140  
Other collateral*                        40                            30                   140  
(Source: RBI) 
® LGD*=LGD x (E*/E) where LGD is that of senior unsecured exposure before recognition of 
collateral (45%), E is the current value of exposure (i.e cash lent or securities lent or post) E* is 
the exposure value after risk mitigation. 
* may include industrial properties, land, ship, aircraft, inventories etc. but excludes physical 
asset acquired by the bank as a result of loan default. 
 
LGD under the Advance IRB Approach 
 In A-IRB approach, Banks must use their own internal estimates of LGD (i.e. The LGD attached 
to any particular exposure should be minimum of downturn LGD or long run default weighted 
average LGD associated with that exposure, in case a default occur.). Downturn LGD is defined 
as LGDs that should reflect the economic downturn conditions in situations where the loss 
severities are expected to be higher. It is noted that in foundation approach LGD is estimated 
based on the current value of the collateral whereas in case of the advanced approach, all 
collateral values must be evaluated in the light of historical recovery rates. While calculating 
historical LGD and then estimate the probable future LGD, banks should consider all the factors 
which may have a probable effect on the cost of holding (e.g. interest forgone) or collecting on a 
defaulted facility should be considered before for LGD calculation. Direct and indirect cost 
associated with the recovery process should be taken into account. It should also takes into 
account both accounting loss and the economic loss. 
 
Exposure at Default (EAD) 
 
Exposure at Default gives an estimate of the amount outstanding (drawn amounts plus likely 
future drawdowns of yet undrawn lines) when the borrower defaults. Under foundation IRB 
approach, EAD estimate of the on balance sheet exposures (i.e. the drawn amount) should not be 
less than the sum of the amount by which a bank’s regulatory capital would be reduced if the 
exposure were fully written off and any associated specific provisions and partial write offs. For 
the off balance sheet items, exposure is calculated as the committed but undrawn amount 
multiplied by a credit conversion factor (CCF). EAD under Advance IRB approach, banks must 
estimate an EAD for each facility that aims to reflect economic downturn conditions i.e. downturn 
EAD to capture the relevant risks. This downturn EAD cannot be less than the long-run average 
EAD for that type of facility. The Banks will be allowed to use their internal estimates of CCFs. 
 
Effective maturity (M) 
 
For banks using the F-IRB approach, effective maturity (M) will be 2.5 years. Banks using 
advanced IRB approach are required to measure effective maturity. M is defined as the greater of 
one year and the remaining effective maturity in years as defined below. In all cases, M will be no 
greater than 5 years. 
 
Effective Maturity (M) =  tt
t
CFCFt /*                                                                  …   (1) 
Where ܥܨ௧ denotes the cash flows (principal, interest payments and fees) contractually payable by 
the borrower in period t (expressed in number of years). 
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Maturity adjustment (b) =  2)ln(05478.011852.0 PD                       … (4)  
 Risk-weighted assets (RWA) = K x 12.5 x EAD      …  (5) 
 
Where, 
 
K = Minimum capital requirement expressed as a percentage of EAD for the exposure 
EAD = Exposure at Default 
LGD = Loss Given Default of the exposure 
PD = One year Probability of Default of the borrower 
M = Remaining effective maturity of the exposure 
R = Asset Correlation (Correlation between borrower’s exposure and systematic risk factor) 
N(x) = Cumulative normal distribution for a standard normal random variable (i.e. probability that 
a normal random variable with mean zero and variance of one is less than or equal to x) 
G (z) = Inverse Cumulative normal distribution for a standard normal random variable (i.e. value 
of x such that N(x) = z). 
Ln = Natural Logarithm 
 
Market Risks 
 
Market risks are the possibility of loss due to adverse market conditions. It is the risk faced by 
corporate owing to change in perceived value of the instruments. It is risk of losses in on and off 
balance sheet positions arising from movements in market prices. There are two types of market 
risk 1) Standardised Approach 2) Internal Models Approach. As per the latest RBI guidelines vide 
Master Circular No. DBOD.BP.BC.17/21.01.002/2010-2011 dated July 1, 2011 
 
1) Standardised Approach: 
 
Standardised approach uses a building-block approach in which specific risk and the general risk 
arising from positions in financial instruments are calculated separately. Specific risk refers to 
risk of loss caused by an adverse price movement of a security principally due to factors related to 
the issuer. The specific risk charge is designed to protect against an adverse movement in the 
price of an individual security owing to factors related to the individual issuer. The specific risk 
charge is graduated for various exposures under three heads i.e. claims on Government, claims on 
banks, claims on others. The capital requirements for general market risk are designed to capture 
the risk of loss arising from changes in market interest rates. Under the standardised method there 
are two principal methods of measuring market risk, a “maturity” method and a “duration” 
method. As “duration” method is a more accurate method of measuring interest rate risk, it has 
been decided to adopt Standardised Duration method to arrive at the capital charge. Accordingly, 
banks are required to measure the general market risk charge by calculating the price sensitivity 
(modified duration) of each position separately. Under this method, the mechanics are as follows:  
• first calculate the price sensitivity (modified duration) of each instrument;  
• next apply the assumed change in yield to the modified duration of each instrument 
between 0.6 and 1.0 percentage points depending on the maturity of the instrument• slot 
the resulting capital charge measures into a maturity ladder with the fifteen time bands. 
• subject long and short positions (short position is not allowed in India except in 
derivatives and Central Government Securities) in each time band to a 5 per cent vertical 
disallowance designed to capture basis risk 
• Carry forward the net positions in each time-band for horizontal offsetting subject to the 
disallowances.  
 
2) Internal Models Approach (IMA) 
 
IMA calculates market risk capital charge as sum of general market risk charge shall be higher of 
Higher of previous day’s Value-at-risk (VaR)  or average VaR over last 60 business days multiply 
by multiplier factor (absolute floor of 3 as set by supervisory authority) and specific risk (as 
specified by Standard Approach) 
MRC= max൛ܸܴܽ௧ିଵ; (݉௖ + ݌௖)	ݔ	ܸܴܽ௔௩௚ൟ + ݉ܽݔ൛ݏܸܴܽ௧ିଵ; (݉௦ + ݌௦)ݔ	ݏܸܴܽ௔௩௚ 	ൟ          …  (6) 
Where: 
݉௖ 	ܽ݊݀	 ݉௦ are the multiplication factors to be set by the RBI on the basis of their assessment of 
the quality  of the bank’s risk management system, subjected to absolute minimum of three for the 
both the factors. 
 ݌௖ 	ܽ݊݀	 ݌௦ is the plus/ add on factors, generally ranging from 0-1, to be decided by the banks 
based on the result of the back testing its VaR model.  
It requires the banks to comply with both qualitative and quantitative aspects.  
Quantitative standards to be consider for IMA:  
• VaR must be computed on a daily basis. While calculating VaR, a horizon of 10 days and 
observation period of at least 1 year historical data with one tailed confidence level of 
99% is to be used. 
• No particular type of model is prescribed. So long as each model used captures all the 
material risks run by the bank .The banks can use any type of model- variance-covariance 
matrices, historical simulations or Monte Carlo simulation. 
• Recognize correlation within Categories as well as a cross categories (FI and FX etc.) 
• Banks should update their data sets no less frequently than once every three months and 
should also reassess them whenever market prices are subject to material changes. 
Qualitative aspects to be consider for IMA:  
•  Board and senior management should be actively involved. Daily reports for Risk Unit to 
be reviewed by Senior Management in order to take appropriate remedial action, if 
required.  
• Bank’s risk measurement system must be well documented to describe the basic principles 
of risk management system and to provide empirical technique used to measure market 
risk. 
• Independent Risk Control Unit responsible for design and implementation of Bank’s risk 
management systems 
• Regular Back-testing and Stress testing 
• Initial and on-going Validation of Internal Model 
• Risk measurement system should be used in conjunction with Trading and Exposure 
Limits. 
• Independent review of risk measurement systems by internal audit. 
 Operational Risks 
The Operational risk as per Basel Committee is defined as the risk of direct or indirect loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. 
The direct or indirect loss includes the cost to fix the operational risk problem, payment to third 
parties and write down due to the loss incurred from operational risk events. It further includes 
other types of losses or events which should be reflected in the charge such as near misses, latent 
losses or contingent losses. However, strategic and reputation risk in not included in the definition 
of operational risk by Basel Committee. As per the latest RBI guidelines vide Master Circular No. 
DBOD.BP.BC.23/21.06.001/2009-2010 dated July 7, 2009 
 
The Basel Committee has proposed that banks should use one or a combination of three 
alternative approaches while calculating operational risk capital. These approached varies in level 
of sophistication:  
(a) The Basic Indicator Approach: The Basel Committee in Jan 2001, proposed an indicator to 
calculate capital required for operational risk which is the bank’s gross income multiple by 
15% given in the equation (7) 
 Regulatory capital for operational risk = 0.15 x Average of 3 years of Gross Income    … (7)                                                           
 Where value of 15% was proposed by Basel committee, after conducting a study on small 
number of commercial banks. 
(b) The Standardised Approach (TSA)/Alternative Standardised Approach (ASA):   
In the standard approach divides bank’s activities into eight business lines: commercial banking, 
retail banking, retail brokerage, corporate finance, trading & sales, payment & settlement, 
agency services and asset management. Within each business line, gross income is a board 
indicator that serves as a proxy for the scale of operation. Hence, the scale of operation indicates 
risk exposure associated within each of these business lines. The capital charge for each 
business line is calculated by multiplying gross income by a factor (denoted beta) assigned to 
each business line. Beta serves as a proxy for the industry-wide relationship between the 
operational risk loss experience for a given business line and the aggregate level of gross 
income for that business line.   
Table: The values of the β  
Business Lines Indicator 
Beta 
Factors (%) 
Beta Values 
(%) 
Corporate finance Gross Income β1 18 
Trading & sales Gross Income β2 18 
Retail banking Gross Income β3 12 
Commercial banking Gross Income β4 15 
Payment & Settlement Gross Income β5 18 
Agency services Gross Income β6 15 
Asset management Gross Income β7 12 
Retail brokerage Gross Income β8 12 
(Source: RBI) 
KTSA= ൛∑ ܯܽݔ[∑(ܩܫଵି଼	ݔ	ߚଵି଼), 0]ଵିଷ	௬௘௔௥ ൟ/3                         …  (8) 
Where: KTSA = the capital charge under the standardised approach 
GI1-8= annual gross income in a given year, for each business lines. 
β1-8= a fixed percentage, set by the supervisory committee. 
The Alternative Standardised Approach (ASA) 
Under the ASA, the operational risk capital charge methodology is same as for TSA except there 
are two business lines- retail banking and commercial banking. In this method, loans & advances 
of these business lines is multiplied by a fixed factor “m”- which is replaces gross income as the 
exposure indicator. The betas for retail and commercial banking remain unchanged from TSA. 
The ASA operational risk capital charge for retail banking can be expressed as  
KRB = βRB x m x LARB                                                                                     ….   (9) 
Where  
KRB is the capital charge for the retail banking business line. 
βRB is the beta for the retail banking business line. 
LARB is total outstanding retail loans and advances (non-risk weighted and gross of provisions), 
averaged over the past three years 
m is 0.035 
Similarly the capital charge for the commercial banking is calculated. The total capital charge for 
the ASA is calculated as the simple summation of the regulatory capital charges for retail and 
commercial banking.  
(c) Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA): 
Under the AMA, the regulatory capital requirement will equal to the risk measure generated by 
the bank’s internal operational risk measurement using quantitative and qualitative criteria. There 
are certain qualitative standards which banks are required to follow in order to adopt the AMA for 
the operational risk management. The bank must have an independent operational risk 
management function that will be responsible for the design and the implementation of codifying 
the firm level policies and procedures as well as ensuring the control by implementing risk-
reporting system. Further, this system should be regularly reviewed and validated by 
internal/external auditors. A bank must demonstrate that its approach is able to capture potential 
severe ‘tail’ loss events through its quantitative standards, as there are losses with a low frequency 
but higher in the magnitude . This approach use one year holding period and a 99.9th percentile 
confidence internal. Operational risk capital charge is sum of expected loss and unexpected loss. 
Expected loss of the banks can be determined through internal provision. For estimate unexpected 
losses, bank’s internal measurement system must reasonably on the combined use of internal and 
relevant external loss data, scenario analysis and bank-specific business environment and internal 
control factors. 
Methodology of the Study  
Our study is based on a time-series data of the volume of bank credit in India vis-à-vis 
fundamental macroeconomic variables between 2006-07 and 2012-13. It aims at devising a 
suitable stochastic loss function for the banks. This function comprises key variables like interest 
rate, credit-spread, risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratios, composite risk index comprising credit 
and market risks and the random error term comprising operational risks. The methodology 
employed in our study uses the concept of Loss function which is defined as the aggregate losses 
suffered by the banks as result of various types of risks. Symbolically this loss function is denoted 
by: Li = ƒ [Ai, Mi, ri, ci, si, pi, ui] where, Li denotes the concept of Loss function represented by 
the aggregate losses suffered by the banks as a result of various types of risks which are 
represented by explanatory variables enclosed in parenthesis on right hand side of the equation, Ai 
denote the asset-base of the banks, Mi denote the total volume of bank credit, ri denote the interest 
rate, ci denote capital adequacy ratio of the banks, si denote the credit spread of the banks, pi 
denote the composite risk index of the banks based on kernel density function, ui denote the 
random error term and ƒ denotes the functional form. The variable pi in the above equation 
denotes the composite risk index based on major risks faced by the banks, identified as credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk. In order to facilitate meaningful comparison between the banks, 
we take the ratio of the Net Losses to the asset base and also the ratio of the credit flows to the 
asset base of the Individual banks. Hence the modified Loss Function is state as: 
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The parameters of this loss function will be estimated by employing the time-honoured method of 
the Technique of Regression on Panel Data. The database included the abovementioned financial 
details of the banks in three different sectors, namely, 26 PSBs, 19 Private Banks and 18 Foreign 
Banks operating in India are included for the purpose (having net worth above 500 Crores) for 
financial years 2006-07 and 2012-13. The scope of this paper is limited to a detailed empirical 
analysis of the credit risks which are domain components of total risks faced by the banks. 
 
Results of Panel Regression 
Public Sector banks: 
Residual standard error: 0.002644 on 151 degrees of  freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9148,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.8973  
F-statistic: 52.29 on 31 and 151 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
It is observed that the explanatory variables have significant impact the net losses of banks. Also 
the interest rates and credit spreads have reasonably significant impact on the net losses followed 
by Capital Adequacy Ratios (CARs) 
 
Private Sector banks: 
Residual standard error: 0.004221 on 115 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.8687,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.8402  
F-statistic: 30.45 on 25 and 115 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
It is observed that the explanatory variables have significant impact the net losses of banks. Further 
CARs also significant impact net losses followed by the interest rates 
 
Foreign Banks 
 
Residual standard error: 0.01259 on 103 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.6192,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.5342  
F-statistic: 7.282 on 23 and 103 DF,  p-value: 4.476e-13 
 
It is observed that in this sector all the explanatory variables have relatively lesser significant 
impact on the net losses of the banks. This is because fact that total volume of their transactions is 
much lesser compared to banks in other sectors. Hence, none of the variables are significant 
enough to be compared as causing impact on the net losses. 
 
The empirical analysis of the Loss Function chapter has revealed that in terms of the order of 
significance, the interest rate and the capital adequacy ratio have emerged most significant 
variables. However, under the quasi-regulatory monetary regime which is followed in India, Banks 
have relatively little freedom in manipulating these variables at their own choice. Under this 
scenario a suitable policy mechanism needs to be evolved in order to reduce the impact of financial 
risk faced by the banks in India by devising a desirable framework of policies which are aimed at 
reducing the impact of credit risk. 
The Model suggested over here explains the behavior of the banks whose capital adequacy ratio 
lies below the minimum prescribed by the Regulator, in which case their decision will be to 
maintain higher capital cushion. The idea of a capital cushion is established as a caution against 
any future contingency as stated by Wall and Peterson (1987). It will be shown that banks will set 
this cushion whenever the capital adequacy ratio is not wholly controllable (or stochastic) and 
when important sanctions to enforce the capital requirements are in place. In such cases, banks 
would maintain this cushion to prevent the stochastic capital ratio from reaching values below the 
permitted minimum in order to avoid being penalized by the Regulator. 
Two Theoretical Models have been formulated to explain the manner in which the banks set their 
capital to assets ratio in the context of the capital adequacy requirements specified by the 
Regulatory Authority which is enforced through sanctions. Both these models aim at the same 
goal. The first model namely the Market Model describes the behavior of the banks which are not 
under the regulatory purview and they keep their capital to assets ratio higher than the one 
specified by the regulatory authority. This model synthesizes in a theoretical formulation the 
issues proposed in the banking literature which justify an optimum capital structure. This 
structure includes liquidity premium, operations costs associated with the deposits and insurance 
premia. Conversely Wall and Peterson (1987, 1995) devised an alternative model based on the 
factors highlighted above. The second model explains the behavior of the banks which set their 
capital to assets ratio lower than that specified by the Regulator in which case their  decision will 
consist in not merely maintaining the minimum required norm but also in maintaining a Capital 
Cushion against any future contingencies. 
Since in India, all the banks in all the three sectors maintain their respective capital adequacy 
ratios usually higher than the one specified by the Indian regulator (RBI) the Indian banks will be 
more amenable to the first model stated above. This model provide every individual banks with 
an ability to determine its own level of optimum Capital adequacy ratio, but it should not below 
minimum specified by RBI. 
 
Inference of the Model 
From the model illustrated above, it becomes apparent that Optimal Market Capital Ratio is 
directly related to, cost of deposit, capital ratio and random variable ( 2
1u ); whereas it is inversely 
related to risk free interest. This reflects that a high level of banking demand for capital will be 
associated with high costs of deposits and a high variability of capital ratio. For a given level of 
risk free interest, the higher the deposit interest is, the lower will be the liquidity premium 
depositors willing to pay. This would reduce the incentive for the banks to capture debt. 
Moreover, operation costs are a good indicator of efficiency and probability of bankruptcy of a 
bank (Berger, 1995). The sign of variability of capital ratio indicate that the greater dispersion of 
retained earnings (main source of capital in savings banks) of the bank is, the greater the issues of 
other capital instruments liked subordinated debt, hybrid debts capital instruments in order to 
avoid a bank in becoming bankrupt. 
This study recommends that if the model suggested over here is implemented by the Indian banks 
it will ensure the prevalence of sound banking principles and prevent the strain on Government 
exchequer from frequent capital injections to the PSBS as shown in the preceding analysis. This 
study has not used the above model because in India, detailed data on the outstanding debts for 
individual banks is not necessarily available especially in the case of private and foreign banks. 
However, this does not reduce the efficacy of the model suggested above.  
  
An Alternative Formula for Internal Rating Based Credit Risk Weight 
One of the important requirements of the Basel-II framework for the banks is to increase their 
reliance on the Internal Rating Based (IRB) Approach for the banks which is devised to gauge the 
credit-worthiness of their individual borrowing entities. The purpose of this index is to ensure that 
the banks are able to recover their credit with the interest accrued thereupon within the stipulated 
period of the credit sanctioned. This study suggests a simple formula for devising such an index. 
Let M denote the amount of credit which a bank is supposed to extend to any borrowing entity at 
the rate of interest: r for the time-horizon: t. If D denotes the probability of that entity committing 
a default in its repayment of the extended credit amount within the stipulated period. The 
probability D can be arrived at by the past credit history and financial soundness of the particular 
borrower and/or through market intelligence. Then, (1-D) will denote the probability that the 
same borrower meets the stipulated schedule. In order to work out the expected return of the bank 
per unit of its asset we consider the quantity: M/A and the corresponding returns to the bank: R/A. 
The expected return of the bank from its credit is expressed by the following equation: 
 E(R/A) = [(1-D) M/A (1+r)t ] – [D (M/A) (1+r)t1 ] – C  .. (11) 
t denotes the duration of the loan and where t1 denotes the time duration  of default. Usually, t1 is 
lesser than t. In case if t1=t then the loss suffered by the bank in terms of its returns is maximum, 
where C denotes the total cost of estimating the default probability through the following process 
and r denotes the PLR plus margin charged by a bank on loans. 
The efficacy of the above credit-risk index depends upon the ability of a bank to safeguard its 
recovery of the extended credit by charging the defaulter a penalty rate of interest or seeking 
additional collaterals or a recall of the credit facility. It also largely depends upon the near correct 
estimate of the probability of default: D. 
D follows the probability distribution. 
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where x = (x1…,xn) denotes a vector of variables which causes the loan default. 
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P(X1 =1) = (1, 0) such that:  
 X = 1 X1 + … + n Xn  
In order to minimize the default probability we differentiate (5.12) with respect to     X1 … Xn and 
equate the first partials to zero as under: 
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The solutions to eqn. (5.13) provides a vector of values for X1,…, Xn which minimize the default 
probability D. 
It is also suggested that the main Credit Rating Agencies operating in India be brought under the 
purview of an institutional mechanism along the lines of the Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization (NRSRO) operating in the US, in order to eliminate any possibility of biases 
creeping in the Credit Rating Process and that these agencies must be under the payroll of the 
banks rather than the individual borrowers 
Conclusion 
In the light of the salient features of the proposed Basel-III Framework, per se, the said 
framework provides relatively greater safeguards to the banks against the losses arising out of the 
credit risk as well as the impact of the periodic cyclical behavior of the macro economy. 
However, the continued maintenance of the proposed two liquidity ratios of 2.5% each are 
perhaps likely to create certain short-term  problems of the credit-flows especially during the 
periods of economic and/or political uncertainties especially for smaller banks operating in India 
because these two additional buffers over and above the maintenance of the mandatory capital 
adequacy requirements will further diminish the available funds at the disposal of these banks for 
extending the credit requirements during the periods of economic upswings and shrink the base of 
profitability of these banks, making them operationally unviable in the long run. In this context, 
the method proposed in this Study which centres around the application of the model built by 
Wall and Peterson (1987, 1995) to determine the Optimal Capital Adequacy Requirements for the 
individual banks and which has been effectively applied by the Spanish Savings Banks can, 
perhaps prove to be more effective. Besides, the Alternative Index for evaluating the credit risk 
vis-à-vis the individual borrowers, which is fairly simple to evaluate can prove to be a ready 
safeguard for the banks to precisely evaluate the extent of credit risk. 
Further, it also suggests creating an Autonomous Institutional Framework to cover the functioning 
of the Credit Rating Agencies operating in India, along the lines of the Institutes of Chartered 
Accountants and Company Secretaries, need arising, through an Act of Indian Parliament, to 
regulate and monitor the functioning of all the Credit Rating Agencies on a continued basis, so as 
to ensure a greater degree of standardization and accountability on their parts. This suggestion 
stems from occurrence of the global banking crisis during the recent past. Such an institutional 
mechanism has already been recently created in the US as a sequel to the abovementioned event 
along the lines of ‘Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization’ (NRSRO). 
To sum up, this paper suggests one of the significant approaches to have a fresh look at the 
analysis of the credit risks faced by the banks and the measures to minimised the same. 
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Appendix  
                        
  Net Loss/ Total Assets 
S.no NATIONALISED BANKS 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
1 Allahabad Bank       0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.00  
2 Andhra Bank      0.01       0.01    0.00     0.00    0.01      0.01    0.01  
3 Bank of Baroda       0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
4 Bank of India      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
5 Bank of Maharashtra      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
6 Central Bank of India      0.02       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
7 Corporation Bank      0.01       0.01    0.00     0.00    0.00      0.00    0.00  
8 Dena Bank      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.00    0.00      0.00    0.00  
9 Indian Bank       0.01       0.01    0.00     0.00    0.00      0.00    0.01  
10 Indian Overseas Bank       0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
11 Oriental Bank of Commerce      0.02       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
12 Punjab & Sind  Bank       0.01       0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00      0.00    0.01  
13 Punjab National Bank        0.02       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
14 Syndicate Bank      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
15 UCO Bank       0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.02  
16 Union Bank of India      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
17 United Bank of India      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
18 Vijaya Bank      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
19 State Bank of India (SBI)      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.02    0.02  
20 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur       0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
21 State Bank of Hyderabad      0.01       0.00    0.00     0.00    0.01      0.01    0.01  
22 State Bank of Indore      0.01       0.00    0.00     0.01         -            -          -   
23 State Bank of Mysore      0.01       0.01    0.01     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
24 State Bank of Patiala      0.01       0.01    0.00     0.01    0.01      0.01    0.01  
25 State Bank of Travancore       0.01       0.01    0.01     0.00    0.01      0.01    0.01  
26 IDBI Bank Ltd.      0.00       0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00      0.01    0.01  
(Source:IBA) 
 
 
  
Credit Volume/Total Assets 
S.no NATIONALISED BANKS 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Allahabad Bank 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.51 0.54 
2 Andhra Bank 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.57 0.57 
3 Bank of Baroda 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.51 0.53 
4 Bank of India * 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.55 
5 Bank of Maharashtra 0.59 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.51 0.48 
6 Central Bank of India 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.56 0.55 
7 Corporation Bank 0.57 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.53 0.52 
8 Dena Bank 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.51 0.50 
9 Indian Bank 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.53 0.55 
10 Indian Overseas Bank 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.51 0.58 
11 Oriental Bank of Commerce 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.56 
12 Punjab & Sind  Bank 0.53 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.57 
13 Punjab National Bank 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.53 0.61 
14 Syndicate Bank 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.68 0.59 0.57 
15 UCO Bank 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.58 
16 Union Bank of India 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.57 
17 United Bank of India 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.52 0.55 
18 Vijaya Bank 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.51 0.52 
19 State Bank of India (SBI) 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.55 
20 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.57 0.57 
21 State Bank of Hyderabad 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.57 
22 State Bank of Indore 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.67 - - - 
23 State Bank of Mysore 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.56 0.59 
24 State Bank of Patiala 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.52 0.58 
25 State Bank of Travancore 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.54 0.54 
26 IDBI Bank Ltd. 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.54 0.56 
(Source:IBA) 
 
 
 
   
Capital Adequacy - Basel II % 
S.no NATIONALISED BANKS 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Allahabad Bank 12.52% 11.99% 13.11% 13.62% 12.96% 12.83% 11.03% 
2 Andhra Bank 11.33% 11.61% 13.22% 13.93% 14.38% 13.18% 11.76% 
3 Bank of Baroda 11.80% 12.91% 14.05% 14.36% 14.52% 14.67% 13.30% 
4 Bank of India * 11.75% 12.95% 13.01% 12.94% 12.17% 11.95% 11.02% 
5 Bank of Maharashtra 12.06% 10.85% 12.05% 12.78% 13.35% 12.43% 12.59% 
6 Central Bank of India 10.40% 10.42% 13.12% 12.24% 11.64% 12.40% 11.49% 
7 Corporation Bank 12.76% 12.09% 13.61% 15.37% 14.11% 13.00% 12.33% 
8 Dena Bank 11.52% 11.09% 12.07% 12.77% 13.41% 11.51% 11.03% 
9 Indian Bank 14.14% 12.74% 13.98% 12.71% 13.56% 13.47% 13.08% 
10 Indian Overseas Bank 13.27% 11.93% 13.20% 14.78% 14.55% 13.32% 11.85% 
11 Oriental Bank of Commerce 12.51% 12.12% 12.98% 12.54% 14.23% 12.69% 12.04% 
12 Punjab & Sind  Bank 12.88% 11.57% 14.35% 13.10% 12.94% 13.26% 12.91% 
13 Punjab National Bank 12.29% 12.96% 14.03% 14.16% 12.42% 12.63% 12.72% 
14 Syndicate Bank 11.74% 11.22% 12.68% 12.70% 13.04% 12.24% 12.59% 
15 UCO Bank 11.56% 10.09% 11.93% 13.21% 13.71% 12.35% 14.22% 
16 Union Bank of India 12.80% 12.51% 13.27% 12.51% 12.95% 11.85% 11.45% 
17 United Bank of India 12.02% 11.24% 13.28% 12.80% 13.05% 12.69% 11.66% 
18 Vijaya Bank 11.21% 11.22% 13.15% 12.50% 13.88% 13.06% 11.32% 
19 State Bank of India (SBI) 12.34% 13.54% 14.25% 13.39% 11.98% 13.86% 12.92% 
20 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 12.89% 13.50% 14.52% 13.30% 11.68% 13.76% 12.16% 
21 State Bank of Hyderabad 12.51% 12.35% 11.53% 14.90% 14.25% 13.56% 12.36% 
22 State Bank of Indore 11.77% 11.31% 13.46% 13.53% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
23 State Bank of Mysore 11.47% 12.34% 12.99% 12.42% 13.76% 12.55% 11.79% 
24 State Bank of Patiala 12.38% 12.50% 12.60% 13.26% 13.41% 12.30% 11.12% 
25 State Bank of Travancore 11.68% 12.68% 14.03% 13.74% 12.54% 13.55% 11.70% 
26 IDBI Bank Ltd. 13.73% 11.95% 11.57% 11.31% 13.64% 14.58% 13.13% 
 
(Source:IBA) 
 
 
  
 
  
Composite Risk Index 
S.no NATIONALISED BANKS 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Allahabad Bank 4.04 2.69 2.30 2.06 2.94 2.78 5.31 
2 Andhra Bank 0.36 0.32 0.43 0.42 1.09 1.92 3.10 
3 Bank of Baroda 4.50 3.31 2.46 2.70 3.18 4.12 5.23 
4 Bank of India  4.97 3.87 3.38 3.15 5.11 3.21 1.92 
5 Bank of Maharashtra 2.50 1.66 1.45 2.99 2.42 1.01 0.52 
6 Central Bank of India 4.67 4.53 4.60 3.29 3.42 0.90 3.89 
7 Corporation Bank 1.18 0.79 0.71 0.79 1.47 2.11 2.36 
8 Dena Bank 3.36 1.39 1.68 1.85 2.12 1.27 1.38 
9 Indian Bank 0.82 0.60 0.47 0.57 1.46 3.10 4.41 
10 Indian Overseas Bank 2.30 2.44 4.54 3.90 5.04 4.97 5.41 
11 Oriental Bank of Commerce 1.88 3.57 2.41 3.28 3.80 5.45 5.25 
12 Punjab & Sind  Bank 0.60 0.40 0.39 0.45 0.83 1.21 1.74 
13 Punjab National Bank 5.18 4.51 1.40 4.31 4.92 1.13 (0.13) 
14 Syndicate Bank 3.61 4.02 3.39 4.25 4.16 3.06 1.77 
15 UCO Bank 3.83 4.45 4.11 4.26 5.28 5.41 5.37 
16 Union Bank of India 5.02 0.79 1.75 4.26 5.31 4.80 5.61 
17 United Bank of India 3.05 2.03 2.86 3.52 3.04 2.73 3.56 
18 Vijaya Bank 1.19 1.16 1.56 2.60 2.96 2.49 1.37 
19 State Bank of India (SBI) (2.25) (2.20) (2.18) (2.14) (2.15) (2.23) (2.26) 
20 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 1.95 1.35 1.34 1.12 1.24 2.33 2.13 
21 State Bank of Hyderabad 0.47 0.34 0.86 1.20 2.18 2.50 2.44 
22 State Bank of Indore 1.34 0.83 1.00 1.11 - - - 
23 State Bank of Mysore 0.58 0.54 0.66 1.25 1.76 1.81 1.94 
24 State Bank of Patiala 2.11 1.40 1.40 2.12 2.43 2.05 1.91 
25 State Bank of Travancore 2.40 1.76 0.98 1.49 1.69 2.06 1.51 
26 IDBI Bank Ltd. 5.18 4.47 4.46 5.05 5.38 5.01 5.45 
 
 
     Interest rate %  
S.no NATIONALISED BANKS 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
1 Allahabad Bank  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
2 Andhra Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
3 Bank of Baroda  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
4 Bank of India * 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
5 Bank of Maharashtra 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
6 Central Bank of India 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
7 Corporation Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
8 Dena Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
9 Indian Bank  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
10 Indian Overseas Bank  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
11 Oriental Bank of Commerce 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
12 Punjab & Sind  Bank  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
13 Punjab National Bank   15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
14 Syndicate Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
15 UCO Bank  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
16 Union Bank of India 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
17 United Bank of India 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
18 Vijaya Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
19 State Bank of India (SBI) 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
20 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
21 State Bank of Hyderabad 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
22 State Bank of Indore 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
23 State Bank of Mysore 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
24 State Bank of Patiala 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
25 State Bank of Travancore  15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
26 IDBI Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
(Source: RBI) 
 
 
 
   
Credit Spread % 
S.no NATIONALISED BANKS 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Allahabad Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
2 Andhra Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
3 Bank of Baroda 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
4 Bank of India 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
5 Bank of Maharashtra 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
6 Central Bank of India 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
7 Corporation Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
8 Dena Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
9 Indian Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
10 Indian Overseas Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
11 Oriental Bank of Commerce 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
12 Punjab & Sind  Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
13 Punjab National Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
14 Syndicate Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
15 UCO Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
16 Union Bank of India 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
17 United Bank of India 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
18 Vijaya Bank 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
19 State Bank of India (SBI) 3.72% 3.65% 3.82% 3.60% 4.05% 4.62% 3.93% 
20 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 3.72% 3.65% 3.82% 3.60% 4.05% 4.62% 3.93% 
21 State Bank of Hyderabad 3.72% 3.65% 3.82% 3.60% 4.05% 4.62% 3.93% 
22 State Bank of Indore 3.72% 3.65% 3.82% 3.60% 4.05% 4.62% 3.93% 
23 State Bank of Mysore 3.72% 3.65% 3.82% 3.60% 4.05% 4.62% 3.93% 
24 State Bank of Patiala 3.72% 3.65% 3.82% 3.60% 4.05% 4.62% 3.93% 
25 State Bank of Travancore 3.72% 3.65% 3.82% 3.60% 4.05% 4.62% 3.93% 
26 IDBI Bank Ltd. 3.99% 3.67% 4.01% 3.83% 4.28% 4.10% 3.76% 
(Source: RBI) 
 
 
 
  
S.No. Pvt Banks 
Net Loss/Total Assets 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 City Union Bank Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 - - 
4 The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 - - - 
4 The Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
5 The Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
6 The Federal Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
7 The Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
8 The Karnataka Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
9 The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
10 The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
11 Nainital Bank Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
12 The Ratnakar Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 The South Indian Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
14 Axis Bank Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 Development Credit Bank Ltd. 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
16 HDFC Bank Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
17 ICICI Bank Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
18 Indusind Bank Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
20 YES Bank - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(Source: IBA) 
 
 
 
 
S.No. Pvt Banks 
Credit Volume/Total Assets 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 City Union Bank Ltd. 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.66 
2 ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 0.62 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.61 0.58 
3 SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd. 0.49 0.54 0.43 0.32 0.41 - - 
4 The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.48 - - - 
4 The Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.65 
5 The Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 0.53 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.56 
6 The Federal Bank Ltd. 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
7 The Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.55 
8 The Karnataka Bank Ltd. 0.59 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.61 
9 The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.63 
10 The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.66 
11 Nainital Bank Ltd. 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.50 
12 The Ratnakar Bank Ltd. 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.49 
13 The South Indian Bank Ltd. 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.68 0.64 
14 Axis Bank Ltd. 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.58 
15 Development Credit Bank Ltd. 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.58 
16 HDFC Bank Ltd. 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.60 
17 ICICI Bank Ltd. 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.54 
18 Indusind Bank Ltd. 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.60 
19 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.58 
20 YES Bank 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.61 0.58 0.52 0.47 
(Source: IBA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S.No Pvt Banks 
Capital Adequacy - Basel II % 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 City Union Bank Ltd. 12.58% 12.48% 12.69% 13.46% 12.75% 12.57% 13.98% 
2 ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 10.56% 10.20% 11.65% 14.91% 12.94% 14.00% 13.24% 
3 
SBI Commercial & 
International Bank Ltd. 20.93% 25.06% 21.24% 27.31% 28.16% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 11.32% 11.87% 11.50% 7.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 
The Catholic Syrian Bank 
Ltd. 9.58% 10.87% 12.29% 10.82% 11.22% 11.08% 12.29% 
5 
The Dhanalakshmi Bank 
Ltd. 9.77% 9.21% 15.38% 12.99% 11.80% 9.49% 11.06% 
6 The Federal Bank Ltd. 13.43% 22.46% 20.22% 18.36% 16.79% 16.64% 14.73% 
7 
The Jammu & Kashmir 
Bank Ltd. 13.24% 12.80% 14.48% 15.89% 13.72% 13.36% 12.83% 
8 The Karnataka Bank Ltd. 11.03% 12.17% 13.48% 12.37% 13.33% 12.84% 13.22% 
9 The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 14.51% 12.58% 14.92% 14.49% 14.41% 14.33% 14.41% 
10 
The Lakshmi Vilas Bank 
Ltd. 12.43% 12.73% 10.29% 14.82% 13.19% 13.10% 12.32% 
11 Nainital Bank Ltd. 12.89% 12.32% 13.10% 15.68% 16.90% 15.09% 14.43% 
12 The Ratnakar Bank Ltd. 34.34% 49.15% 42.30% 34.07% 56.41% 23.20% 17.11% 
13 The South Indian Bank Ltd. 11.08% 13.80% 14.76% 15.39% 14.01% 14.00% 13.91% 
14 Axis Bank Ltd. 11.57% 13.73% 13.69% 15.80% 12.65% 13.66% 17.00% 
15 
Development Credit Bank 
Ltd. 11.34% 13.38% 13.30% 14.85% 13.25% 15.41% 13.61% 
16 HDFC Bank Ltd. 13.08% 13.60% 15.70% 17.44% 16.22% 16.50% 16.80% 
17 ICICI Bank Ltd. 11.69% 14.92% 15.53% 19.41% 19.54% 18.52% 18.74% 
18 Indusind Bank Ltd. 12.54% 11.91% 12.55% 15.33% 15.89% 13.85% 15.36% 
19 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 13.46% 18.65% 20.01% 18.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
20 YES Bank 13.60% 13.60% 16.60% 20.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
(Source: IBA) 
 
 
  
S.No Pvt Banks 
Interest rate % 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 City Union Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
2 ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
3 
SBI Commercial & 
International Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
4 The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
4 
The Catholic Syrian Bank 
Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
5 The Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
6 The Federal Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
7 
The Jammu & Kashmir Bank 
Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
8 The Karnataka Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
9 The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
10 The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
11 Nainital Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
12 The Ratnakar Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
13 The South Indian Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
14 Axis Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
15 
Development Credit Bank 
Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
16 HDFC Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
17 ICICI Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
18 Indusind Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
19 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
20 YES Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
(Source: RBI) 
 
 
S.No. Pvt Banks 
Credit Spread% 
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
1 City Union Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
2 ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
3 SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
4 The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
4 The Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
5 The Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
6 The Federal Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
7 The Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
8 The Karnataka Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
9 The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
10 The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
11 Nainital Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
12 The Ratnakar Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
13 The South Indian Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.23% 5.06% 5.11% 4.88% 4.88% 
14 Axis Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.25% 5.14% 5.16% 5.32% 5.57% 
15 Development Credit Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.25% 5.14% 5.16% 5.32% 5.57% 
16 HDFC Bank Ltd.  4.37% 4.88% 5.25% 5.14% 5.16% 5.32% 5.57% 
17 ICICI Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.25% 5.14% 5.16% 5.32% 5.57% 
18 Indusind Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.25% 5.14% 5.16% 5.32% 5.57% 
19 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 4.37% 4.88% 5.25% 5.14% 5.16% 5.32% 5.57% 
20 YES Bank 4.37% 4.88% 5.25% 5.14% 5.16% 5.32% 5.57% 
(Source: RBI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S.No. Pvt Banks 
Composite Risk Index 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 City Union Bank Ltd. 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.38 0.72 0.90 1.27 
2 ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 2.14 1.14 1.73 2.20 1.40 0.87 0.10 
3 SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd. 0.01 - 0.00 0.00 0.01 - - 
4 The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 0.24 0.33 0.46 1.33 - - - 
4 The Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 1.09 0.58 0.72 0.69 1.66 1.45 1.31 
5 The Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 0.57 0.20 0.23 0.40 0.40 0.97 3.42 
6 The Federal Bank Ltd. 1.20 0.46 0.56 1.28 2.81 3.29 3.14 
7 The Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 3.31 2.20 2.36 0.62 0.79 0.81 0.69 
8 The Karnataka Bank Ltd. 2.18 1.17 0.97 1.88 3.46 1.76 3.57 
9 The Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.29 0.20 1.35 1.45 
10 The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 1.04 0.65 0.53 2.52 1.10 3.03 3.57 
11 Nainital Bank Ltd. - - - - - - - 
12 The Ratnakar Bank Ltd. 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.08 
13 The South Indian Bank Ltd. 1.45 0.36 1.12 0.60 0.90 1.31 3.32 
14 Axis Bank Ltd. 3.62 2.60 2.63 3.41 2.98 1.20 (0.11) 
15 Development Credit Bank Ltd. 0.79 0.29 1.06 1.06 0.61 0.48 0.60 
16 HDFC Bank Ltd. 3.40 2.95 3.30 3.33 3.48 2.96 2.73 
17 ICICI Bank Ltd. (2.03) (1.99) (2.00) (2.01) (2.02) (2.09) (2.13) 
18 Indusind Bank Ltd. 3.60 2.90 1.50 1.00 1.10 1.65 1.87 
19 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 3.50 2.81 3.01 3.20 3.03 3.56 3.68 
20 YES Bank - 0.09 0.33 0.12 0.13 0.27 0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S. No Foreign Banks 
Net Loss/Total Assets 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 ABN Amro Bank N.V. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
2 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Limited 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
3 Antwerp Diamond Bank N.V. - - - 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06 
4 Bank of America NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
5 Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait  B.S.C. 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 
6 Barclays Bank PLC - 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 
7 BNP Paribas 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 Citibank N.A.. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
9 Deutsche Bank AG 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
10 JPMorgan Chase Bank 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 MIZUHO Corporate Bank Ltd. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
12 Shinhan Bank - - - - - - - 
13 Societe Generale 0.00 - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 Standard Chartered Bank 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
15 State Bank of Mauritius Ltd. - - - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
16 The Bank of Nova Scotia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 The Development Bank of Singapore Ltd. - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
18 HSBC 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(Source: IBA) 
 
 
 
 
S. No Foreign Banks 
Credit Volume/Total Asset 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 ABN Amro Bank N.V. 0.64 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.48 0.45 0.57 
2 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Limited 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.55 
3 Antwerp Diamond Bank N.V. 0.60 0.61 0.72 0.63 0.66 0.78 0.84 
4 Bank of America NA 0.46 0.43 0.34 0.27 0.48 0.38 0.63 
5 Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait  B.S.C. 0.36 0.53 0.47 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.93 
6 Barclays Bank PLC 0.06 0.59 0.51 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.36 
7 BNP Paribas 0.56 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.51 0.53 0.72 
8 Citibank N.A.. 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.47 
9 Deutsche Bank AG 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.78 
10 JPMorgan Chase Bank 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.23 0.22 0.36 
11 MIZUHO Corporate Bank Ltd. 0.69 0.70 0.51 0.50 0.64 0.67 1.40 
12 Shinhan Bank 0.27 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.52 0.86 
13 Societe Generale 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.34 0.59 
14 Standard Chartered Bank 0.51 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.58 
15 State Bank of Mauritius Ltd. 0.26 0.47 0.48 0.66 0.52 0.57 0.71 
16 The Bank of Nova Scotia 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.82 
17 The Development Bank of Singapore Ltd. 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.58 
18 HSBC 0.42 0.39 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.39 
(Source: IBA) 
 
 
 
 
 
S.No Foreign Banks 
Capital Adequacy ratio Basel II % 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 ABN Amro Bank N.V. 11.34% 10.20% 12.66% 12.50% 11.65% 12.46% 14.50% 
2 
Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank Limited 27.66% 55.73% 47.57% 47.57% 45.25% 80.88% 66.82% 
3 
Antwerp Diamond Bank 
N.V. 46.48% 41.91% 26.79% 26.79% 33.73% 25.60% 32.72% 
4 Bank of America NA 13.33% 12.14% 12.73% 12.73% 14.51% 17.59% 18.40% 
5 
Bank of Bahrain and 
Kuwait  B.S.C. 22.00% 24.56% 25.52% 25.52% 23.28% 38.60% 34.70% 
6 Barclays Bank PLC 13.68% 21.11% 17.07% 17.07% 14.89% 14.99% 19.09% 
7 BNP Paribas 10.76% 11.79% 12.37% 12.37% 11.92% 14.70% 13.82% 
8 Citibank N.A.. 11.06% 12.13% 13.23% 13.23% 17.31% 16.03% 15.90% 
9 Deutsche Bank AG 10.62% 15.44% 15.25% 15.25% 15.03% 14.12% 14.08% 
10 JPMorgan Chase Bank 16.14% 17.72% 15.90% 15.90% 22.99% 23.96% 26.89% 
11 
MIZUHO Corporate 
Bank Ltd. 34.40% 27.80% 37.58% 37.58% 87.25% 60.27% 48.11% 
12 Shinhan Bank 89.27% 62.62% 36.80% 36.80% 50.73% 40.25% 34.48% 
13 Societe Generale 31.82% 28.00% 22.47% 22.47% 16.23% 36.61% 29.35% 
14 Standard Chartered Bank 10.44% 11.56% 11.56% 11.56% 11.88% 11.05% 13.00% 
15 
State Bank of Mauritius 
Ltd. 38.99% 41.13% 38.01% 38.01% 45.66% 39.02% 55.02% 
16 The Bank of Nova Scotia 23.26% 20.15% 13.38% 13.38% 18.59% 24.00% 21.40% 
17 
The Development Bank 
of Singapore Ltd. 29.24% 21.25% 15.70% 16.96% 14.98% 14.38% 12.99% 
18 HSBC. 11.06% 15.31% 15.31% 15.31% 18.03% 16.04% 17.10% 
(Source: IBA) 
 
 
 S. No Foreign Banks 
Interest rate % 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 ABN Amro Bank N.V. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
2 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
Limited 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
3 Antwerp Diamond Bank N.V. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
4 Bank of America NA 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
5 
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait  
B.S.C. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
6 Barclays Bank PLC 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
7 BNP Paribas 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
8 Citibank N.A.. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
9 Deutsche Bank AG 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
10 JPMorgan Chase Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
11 MIZUHO Corporate Bank Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
12 Shinhan Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
13 Societe Generale 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
14 Standard Chartered Bank 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
15 State Bank of Mauritius Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
16 The Bank of Nova Scotia 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
17 
The Development Bank of 
Singapore Ltd. 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
18 HSBC 15.75% 16.75% 15.75% 9.50% 10.75% 10.25% 10.25% 
(Source: RBI) 
 
 
 
 S. No Foreign Banks 
Credit Spread % 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 ABN Amro Bank N.V. 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
2 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Limited 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
3 Antwerp Diamond Bank N.V. 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
4 Bank of America NA 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
5 Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait  B.S.C. 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
6 Barclays Bank PLC 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
7 BNP Paribas 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
8 Citibank N.A.. 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
9 Deutsche Bank AG 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
10 JPMorgan Chase Bank 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
11 MIZUHO Corporate Bank Ltd. 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
12 Shinhan Bank  5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
13 Societe Generale 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
14 Standard Chartered Bank 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
15 State Bank of Mauritius Ltd. 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
16 The Bank of Nova Scotia 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
17 The Development Bank of Singapore Ltd. 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
18 HSBC 5.75% 6.53% 8.10% 7.17% 5.64% 5.74% 5.50% 
(Source: RBI) 
 
 
 
 
S. No Foreign Banks 
Composite Risk Index 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 ABN Amro Bank N.V. 0.86 (0.73) (0.66) 0.06 (0.68) 1.69 0.60 
2 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Limited 0.05 - - 0.00 0.18 - - 
3 Antwerp Diamond Bank N.V. - - - 0.92 0.66 0.52 - 
4 Bank of America NA - - - - - - - 
5 Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait  B.S.C. 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.47 0.35 
6 Barclays Bank PLC - 1.04 (1.72) (1.78) 1.18 0.78 2.03 
7 BNP Paribas - - 0.45 - - 0.12 - 
8 Citibank N.A.. (1.99) (2.07) (2.10) (2.24) (2.06) (2.16) (2.08) 
9 Deutsche Bank AG 0.02 0.49 1.13 1.41 1.23 0.33 0.46 
10 JPMorgan Chase Bank 0.70 0.72 0.12 0.40 - - - 
11 MIZUHO Corporate Bank Ltd. - - - - - - 1.45 
12 Shinhan Bank - - - - - - - 
13 Societe Generale - - - - - - - 
14 Standard Chartered Bank (1.98) (2.10) (1.85) (2.32) 0.78 (2.19) (2.05) 
15 State Bank of Mauritius Ltd. - - - 0.23 0.46 0.20 0.24 
16 The Bank of Nova Scotia - - - - - - 0.57 
17 The Development Bank of Singapore Ltd. - 0.03 0.20 0.57 0.86 1.83 (0.04) 
18 HSBC 1.22 (0.76) (0.96) (2.30) (1.85) (1.72) 1.84 
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